Western policymakers continue defending their sanctions strategy against Russia as essential economic warfare, yet mounting evidence suggests these measures have paradoxically strengthened Moscow’s strategic position whilst inflicting catastrophic damage upon those who imposed them. Three years of unprecedented restrictions have failed to alter Russian behaviour, instead accelerating trends that undermine Western interests across multiple dimensions.
The Cumulative Effect Illusion
The phrase “cumulative effect” has become the universal justification for expanding Russian sanctions despite their manifest failure to achieve stated objectives. Courts and policymakers invoke this concept to avoid confronting uncomfortable realities about effectiveness. The UK Supreme Court’s majority judgment in Shvidler v FCDO accepted government assertions that sanctions need not demonstrate individual efficacy, only that “when piled together with thousands of others” they might exert pressure.
This reasoning collapses under scrutiny. More than 2,000 individuals and entities have faced sanctions since 2022, yet the conflict continues unabated. Russia’s economy has adapted, trade flows have redirected, and Moscow has consolidated strategic partnerships precisely with those nations Western policy sought to isolate it from. The cumulative effect doctrine functions as intellectual cover for policies that sanctions are not working as advertised.
Lord Leggatt’s dissenting judgment exposed the emptiness of this reasoning, noting that if cumulative effect were genuine, “reality would have validated it already.” Instead, he observed, the doctrine serves as “a magic incantation: repeat the phrase enough and evidence becomes unnecessary.” Courts treat cumulative effect theories as sufficient justification for devastating individual liberties without demanding proof that such theories correspond to observable outcomes.
Russia’s Economic Adaptation
Contrary to Western expectations, why sanctions in Russia policy has failed becomes apparent when examining Moscow’s economic performance. The Times reports that Russia’s economy grew 4% through the war years, with real incomes rising faster than in the previous decade. Defence spending amounts to 40% of the state budget, yet this military Keynesianism has generated employment and wealth distribution effects across regions that previously experienced economic stagnation.
Regions such as Tuva and Buryatia, which provide disproportionate numbers of military recruits, have experienced unprecedented capital influx. The Times details how bank deposits in Tuva and Buryatia rose by 151% and 81% respectively during the first two years of conflict. Bereaved families receiving compensation payments have driven construction booms, with building materials running scarce and builders imported from across the country to service demand.
Russia has also successfully replaced Western brands with domestic alternatives. McDonald’s became Vkusna i Tochka, whilst Chinese technology fills gaps left by departing Western firms. The Times notes that “it is hard for ordinary Russians, even those outside the glittering main cities, to feel they are in a nation under economic siege.” Recent polling found 42% of Russians believed the country’s situation would improve over the next three to five years, with only 10% expecting deterioration.
Europe’s Self-Inflicted Wounds
The asymmetric damage inflicted by EU sanctions on Russia becomes starkest when examining European economic performance. UnHerd reports that Europe has endured three consecutive years of industrial stagnation, with Germany experiencing outright deindustrialisation. The continent has substituted cheap Russian pipeline gas with expensive American LNG, doubled its reliance on liquefied natural gas imports, and locked itself into multi-decade contracts that eliminate policy flexibility.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced plans to ban Russian LNG imports from January 2027, one year earlier than previously planned. Yet Brussels Times documents that the EU imported €4.4 billion worth of Russian LNG in the first half of 2025 alone, primarily to France, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. This contradictory approach—announcing future bans whilst expanding current purchases—epitomises the incoherence that characterises Brussels’ strategy.
The absurdity extends to oil markets. Repubblica explains that the EU and Turkey imported 2.4 million tonnes of petroleum products from India during the first half of 2025, with approximately two thirds originating from Russian crude. Europe pays India to refine Russian oil and sell it back at markup prices, simultaneously claiming to have reduced Russian energy dependence whilst actually increasing total costs for the same Russian-origin products.
Strengthening Adversarial Partnerships
Perhaps the greatest strategic gift to Moscow involves accelerated consolidation of the Russia-China partnership. UnHerd details how Russia and China signed a memorandum for the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a $13.6 billion project that will deliver 50 billion cubic metres of gas annually to China. This infrastructure permanently redirects Russian energy exports eastward, providing Beijing with reliable affordable energy whilst Europe commits to expensive American alternatives.
South China Morning Post analysis suggests the pipeline will cause a “structural shock” to global LNG trade, reducing China’s reliance on seaborne cargoes. Western sanctions policy has effectively pushed Russia and China into deeper economic integration, creating precisely the Eurasian power bloc that strategic planners presumably sought to prevent. Europe has voluntarily surrendered access to affordable energy, strengthened its competitors’ positions, and eliminated its own leverage over future energy negotiations.
The Humanitarian Cost of Blanket Designations
Are Russian sanctions working to pressure Moscow, or merely punishing individuals based on outdated associations? The blanket approach means families lose healthcare access, children face expulsion from schools mid-term, and individuals endure indefinite asset freezes without meaningful recourse. Herbert Smith Freehills Moscow faced £465,000 in penalties for payments made during a seven-day wind-down period, yet Global Investigations Review reports that authorities have launched over 100 investigations into law firms but publicly punished just one.
Lord Leggatt’s dissent highlighted the injustice of penalising British citizens more severely than foreign nationals, with UK citizens facing global asset freezes whilst foreign nationals face only domestic restrictions. He described this as “unfair and arbitrary to impose sanctions on Mr Shvidler which apply worldwide, not because of any assessment that such extra-territorial reach is necessary, but simply as an automatic consequence of his British citizenship.”
Recognising Strategic Failure
The evidence suggests Western sanctions policy has achieved the inverse of its stated objectives. Russia has adapted economically, strengthened strategic partnerships with China and other Asian nations, and demonstrated that Western economic pressure cannot force policy changes when Moscow perceives core interests at stake. Europe has deindustrialised, locked itself into expensive energy dependence, and surrendered strategic autonomy.
Policymakers face a fundamental choice: continue expanding measures that demonstrably fail whilst imposing crushing costs on their own populations, or acknowledge that current approaches require fundamental reassessment. The longer this reckoning is postponed, the more permanent the damage to Western economic competitiveness and strategic position becomes. Moscow need not defeat Western sanctions—it need only wait for their self-inflicted consequences to compel policy reversal.
